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DRUNK OR DISABLED? THE LEGAL AND SOCIAL




"Roy Tarpley is among the best basketball players who never
starred in the NBA."1 Roy Tarpley ("Tarpley") never starred in the
National Basketball Association ("NBA") because of his ongoing
problems with alcohol and drugs.2 In 1989, the NBA suspended
Tarpley from the league for failing a mandatory drug test.3 In
1991, the NBA suspended Tarpley again after the police arrested
him for driving while intoxicated. 4 Later that year, the NBA dis-
missed Tarpley from the league for failing another drug test, but
the NBA reinstated him in 1994. 5 In 1995, the NBA dismissed
Tarpley again after he failed yet another drug test.6 In 2003, the
NBA denied Tarpley's application for reinstatement, even though
he had passed all drug tests during the past four years.7
The NBA can approve or deny the reinstatement of a previ-
ously dismissed player at its discretion. 8 The Equal Employment
1. Posting of Michael McCann to Sports Law Blog, Roy Tarpley, Addiction, and
the American with Disabilities Act, http://sports-law.blogspot.com/2007/08/roy-tarp-
ley-addiction-and-american-with.html (Aug. 3, 2007, 18:34 EST) [hereinafter Tarp-
ley, Addiction].
2. See Associated Press, Tarpley Seeking $6.5 Million in Damages After Favorable
EEOC Ruling, ESPN.coM, Aug 1, 2007, http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/
story?id=2957945 (explaining NBA frequently disciplined Tarpley for alcohol and
drug related conduct). "[Tarpley's] career with the Mavericks ... was interrupted
by one suspension and ended by another .... " Id.
3. See Tarpley, Addiction, supra note 1 (noting NBA suspended Tarpley in 1989
for failing drug tests).
4. See id. (stating NBA suspended Tarpley in 1991 after police arrested him
for driving while intoxicated).
5. See id. (noting NBA dismissed Tarpley in 1991 for failing drug test but rein-
stated him in 1994).
6. See id. (explaining NBA dismissed Tarpley in 1995 for failing drug test).
7. See id. ("Although . . . Tarpley had remained in good physical condition
and had repeatedly passed drug tests (including those for alcohol, the substance
which led to Tarpley being banned in 1995), the NBA rejected the petition.").
8. See NAT'L BASKETBALL PLAYERS ASS'N, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT,
art. XXXIII, § 12(a) (July 29, 2005), available at http://www.nbpa.com/
cbaarticles/article-XXXIII.php [hereinafter Art. XXXIII] ("The approval of the
NBA and the Players Association shall rest in their absolute and sole discretion,
and their decision shall be final, binding, and unappealable."). For a further dis-
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Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") reviewed the NBA's exercise of
discretion in this matter and found that the NBA discriminated
against Tarpley9 and violated the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA") when it refused to reinstate him in 2003.10 Specifically,
the EEOC found that Tarpley provided the NBA with adequate evi-
dence establishing that he was qualified to play in the league, no
longer abused alcohol, and no longer used drugs. 1 Tarpley filed a
lawsuit against the NBA and the Dallas Mavericks claiming that,
"they discriminated against him by refusing reinstatement on the
basis of his disability as a recovering alcoholic and drug abuser." 12
This Comment explores the legal and social consequences of
Roy Tarpley's discrimination claim against the NBA. Section II out-
lines the facts of Tarpley's claim, 13 closely examines the ADA's pro-
visions regarding employment and alcohol and drug abuse by
taking a comprehensive look at recent case law, 1 4 and details the
National Basketball Players Association Anti-Drug policy. 15 Section
9. See Associated Press, supra note 2 (stating EEOC believes it was unlawful for
NBA to refuse to reinstate Tarpley). "The Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC) is the federal agency responsible for enforcing employment dis-
crimination laws." EEOC Training Institute, http://www.eeotraining.eeoc.gov
(lasted visited May 1, 2008). The process for filing an employment discrimination
claim is different than the process for filing most other lawsuits. See EEOC's
Charge Processing Procedures, http://www.eeoc.gov/charge/over-
view-charge-processing.html (last visited May 1, 2008) (delineating procedure for
filing ADA claim with EEOC). First, an individual must file the claim with the
EEOC; then, the EEOC may suggest mediation, dismiss the claim, or commence
investigation if it believes that the claim has merit. See id. After the investigation is
complete, the EEOC may then suggest mediation, dismiss the claim, or issue a
right to sue letter if it still believes that the claim has merit. See id. Upon receiving
a right to sue letter, the individual has ninety days from receipt of the right to sue
letter to file a discrimination lawsuit in court. See id.
10. See Tarpley, Addiction, supra note 1 (stating EEOC ruled that NBA violated
ADA by refusing to reinstate Tarpley in 2003). The ADA protects individuals with
disabilities from discrimination. See id. (describing ADA). "Alcoholics and drug
addicts (although not those engaged in current use of illegal drugs) are protected
by the ADA, provided they are able to perform the essential functions of the job."
Id. For a further discussion of the ADA, see infra notes 64-143 and accompanying
text.
11. See Tarpley, Addiction, supra note 1 ("The EEOC believed Tarpley offered
enough evidence that he could play in the NBA, since he showed that he no longer
used drugs and apparently had his alcoholism under control.").
12. Associated Press, Ex-Mav Ta~pley Sues Team and NBA, Claiming Discrimina-
tion, USA TODAY, Sept. 26, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/basketball/
nba/2007-09-26-tarpley-suit N.htm?csp=34 [hereinafter Tarpley Sues Team].
13. For a further discussion of the facts of Tarpley's claim, see infra notes 19-
63 and accompanying text.
14. For a further discussion of the ADA, see infra notes 64-143 and accompa-
nying text.
15. For a further discussion of the National Basketball Players Association's
Anti-Drug policy, see infra notes 144-68 and accompanying text.
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TARPLEY'S NBA DIscRIMINATION CLAIM
III analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of Tarpley's claim.16 Sec-
tion IV proposes a potential consequence of a verdict in favor of
Tarpley. 17 Finally, Section V concludes that the court will not find
in Tarpley's favor.'8
II. BACKGROUND
A. Facts of Tarpley's Claim
Roy Tarpley, a seven foot tall power forward, excelled in bas-
ketball at the University of Michigan in the mid-eighties. 19 Tarp-
ley's professional basketball career commenced in 1986 when the
Dallas Mavericks selected him seventh overall in the NBA draft.20
Tarpley's basketball success continued during his first two seasons
in the NBA and his career appeared promising. 21 Nevertheless, his
ongoing addiction to alcohol and drugs worsened during this
time. 22 Tarpley sought counseling and treatment, but neither was
successful. 23
Tarpley's basketball career began its descent during the 1988-
1989 season when a series of knee injuries sidelined him for most of
16. For a further discussion of the legal analysis of Tarpley's claim, see infra
notes 169-235 and accompanying text.
17. For a further discussion of a potential consequence of a verdict in Tarp-
ley's favor, see infra notes 236-54 and accompanying text.
18. For a further discussion of the viability of Tarpley's claim, see infra notes
255-70 and accompanying text.
19. See Tarpley, Addiction, supra note 1 (describing Tarpley's basketball career
at University of Michigan as "stellar"); see also Roy Tarpley Past Stats, http://
www.databasebasketball.com/players/playerpage.htm?ilkid=TarplRo01 (last vis-
ited May 1, 2008) (displaying Tarpley's statistics at University of Michigan, includ-
ing 13.1 points per game and 7.8 rebounds per game).
20. See Tarpley, Addiction, supra note I (stating Dallas Mavericks selected Tarp-
ley with seventh pick in 1986 NBA draft).
21. See id. (describing how Tarpley made all-rookie team after first year, won
NBA's Sixth Man of the Year Award after second year, and helped Mavericks win
fifty-three games and make it to Western Conference Finals); Roy Tarpley Past
Stats, supra note 19 (displaying Tarpley's first NBA season statistics, including 7.5
points per game and 7.1 rebounds per game in seventy-five games and Tarpley's
second season statistics, including 13.5 points per game and 11.8 rebounds per
game in eighty-one games). "Tarpley initially seemed like a star in the making."
Tarpley, Addiction, supra note 1.
22. See Tarpley, Addiction, supra note 1 (noting Tarpley's alcohol and cocaine
addictions worsened). Tarpley stated, "[m]y problem was with success. Every time
I was successful, I had to go out and party." Ian Thomsen, Roy Tarpley Seeks Self-
Control, and a Second Chance in the NBA, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 1, 1993, http://
www.iht.com/articles/1993/02/01/tarp.php (explaining Tarpley's alcohol and
drug problems worsened when basketball career was flourishing).
23. See Tarpley, Addiction, supra note 1 (stating Tarpley sought counseling and
treatment for alcohol and drugs, but without success).
2008]
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the season.24 During his time away from the basketball court, Tarp-
ley's addiction to alcohol and drugs continued to worsen. 25 After
failing mandatory drug tests, the NBA suspended him on January 5,
1989.26
The NBA permitted Tarpley to return for the 1989-1990 sea-
son.27 Tarpley, however, failed to take advantage of this opportu-
nity. Six games into the season, the police arrested him for driving
while intoxicated and resisting arrest.2 s
Tarpley's 1990-1991 season was strikingly similar to his 1988-
1989 season. 29 Five games into the season, Tarpley suffered an-
other knee injury, which forced him to miss the rest of the season. 30
Once again, time away from the basketball court exacerbated his
alcohol and drug problems. 31 In March of 1991, the police arrested
Tarpley for driving while intoxicated, and the NBA suspended him
again.32
Tarpley did not play in the 1991-1992 season either; however, it
was not an injury that sidelined him this time.3 3 Pursuant to the
league's collective bargaining agreement, the NBA dismissed Tarp-
ley after he failed another drug test.3 4
Following his dismissal from the NBA, Tarpley moved to
Greece so he could continue to play professional basketball. 35 He
played well in Greece, leading his team to a championship in
24. See id. ("Tarpley's third season proved to be the beginning of his career's
end. He started to suffer a series of knee injuries, which ... caused him to miss
games."). Tarpley played in only nineteen games in his third season. See Roy Tarp-
ley Past Stats, supra note 19 (listing Tarpley's 1988-1989 statistics).
25. See Tarpley, Addiction, supra note 1 ("The time off wasn't a blessing, as
[Tarpley] more heavily dabbled in cocaine and other drugs, and also began con-
suming more alcohol.").
26. See id. (stating NBA suspended Tarpley indefinitely in 1989 for failing
drug tests).
27. See id. (noting Tarpley returned to NBA for 1989-1990 season).
28. See id. (explaining that police arrested Tarpley for driving while intoxi-
cated and resisting arrest six games into 1989-1990 season).
29. For a further discussion of Tarpley's 1988-1989 season, see supra notes 24-
26 and accompanying text.
30. See Tarpley, Addiction, supra note 1 (describing Tarpley's 1990-1991
season).
31. See id. (noting Tarpley's alcohol and drug problems worsened when not
playing basketball).
32. See id. (stating NBA again suspended Tarpley for his arrest for driving
while intoxicated).
33. See id. (explaining Tarpley missed season because of suspension).
34. See Associated Press, supra note 2 (stating NBA dismissed Tarpley in 1991
for using cocaine).
35. See id. (describing Tarpley's activity after NBA dismissal).
[Vol. 15: p. 333
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TARPLEY'S NBA DISCRIMINATION CLAIM
1993.36 The following year, Tarpley returned to the United States
and applied for reinstatement to the NBA.37 The NBA granted his
reinstatement for the 1994-1995 season. 38
Tarpley, then twenty-nine years old, "signed a six-year contract
with the Dallas Mavericks for $20 million,' 39 and his career again
appeared promising.40 Nevertheless, in December of 1995, Tarpley
tested positive for alcohol, failing yet another drug test.41 The NBA
dismissed him again, canceling the remainder of his $20 million
contract with the Mavericks. 42
Tarpley moved back to Greece to play professional basketball,
but in 2000 he returned to the United States unemployed. 43 By
2003 Tarpley was out of money,44 so he applied for reinstatement to
the NBA.45 Even though Tarpley had remained in good physical
condition, repeatedly passed alcohol and drug tests, and entered an
alcohol and drug recovery program,46 the NBA refused to reinstate
36. See Tarpley, Addiction, supra note 1 (noting Tarpley led his team, Aris BC
Salonica, to European Cup in 1993). Tarpley played professional basketball in
Greece for two years. See Associated Press, supra note 2 (commenting on duration
of Tarpley's stay in Greece).
37. See Tarpley, Addiction, supra note I (explaining why Tarpley returned to
United States).
38. See id. (noting NBA's response to Tarpley's application for reinstatement).
39. Id.
40. See id. (listing Tarpley's statistics as thirteen points per game and eight
rebounds per game in fifty-five games during 1994-1995 season).
41. See id. ("[H]e ... failed another drug test - for using alcohol and violating
the terms of a court-imposed personal after-care program."); Associated Press,
supra note 2 (stating Tarpley failed drug test in December 1995).
42. See Tarpley, Addiction, supra note 1 ("With [another failed drug test], the
NBA kicked him out for good, thus negating the remainder of his $20 million
contract.").
43. See id. (stating Tarpley returned to Greece to play basketball, but came
back to United States in 2000).
44. See id. (quotingJeff Bounds & David Wethe, Former Mav Facing Bankruptcy,
DALLAS Bus. J., July 4, 2003, http://www.bizjournals.com/dallas/stories/2003/07/
07/story3.html) (explaining that Tarpley's financial problems stemmed from two
civil judgments, totaling $8.5 million, entered against Tarpley from 1997 death of
Good Samaritan who tried to help Tarpley's friend who got in car accident in
Tarpley's car).
[H]e did not have any cash on hand, checking or savings accounts,
household goods, investments or cars .... [H]e said he has been unem-
ployed for four years, and that he was staying with an unnamed friend in
Arlington. Tarpley indicated this person, or persons, had fed and other-
wise provided for him .... Tarpley has at least $8,596 in credit card bills,
$36,348 in federal tax liabilities dating to 1994 and a California state tax
bill of $13,324 from 1995 ....
Id.
45. See id. (stating Tarpley again applied for reinstatement to NBA).
46. See id. (explaining Tarpley remained healthy, passed all alcohol and drug
tests, and entered treatment program).
2008]
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him.4 7 Tarpley applied for reinstatement numerous times, but the
NBA continued to reject his applications.4 8
"Still wanting to play [professional basketball], Tarpley signed
with the . ..Continental Basketball League ("CBL") . '49 Tarpley
played well during his first season in the CBL, aside from frequent
injuries. 50 After three years, however, his team disbanded. 51 At the
age of forty-one, Tarpley was again unemployed. 52
In July of 2006, Tarpley filed a discrimination claim against the
NBA with the EEOC.53 On May 17, 2007, the EEOC ruled that the
NBA violated the ADA when it refused to reinstate Tarpley.54 The
EEOC attempted to mediate an out of court resolution between
Tarpley and the NBA, but failed, so on June 28, 2007, it issued
Tarpley a right to sue letter.-55
On September 26, 2007, Tarpley filed a lawsuit against the
NBA and the Dallas Mavericks in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas.5 6 In the suit, Tarpley claims that
the NBA discriminated against him when it refused to reinstate him
because of his status as a recovering alcoholic and drug addict.57
Joe Walker, Tarpley's attorney, stated that the purpose of the law-
suit is to make the NBA responsible for its unfair treatment of Tarp-
ley, noting that Tarpley complied with all of the NBA's requests. 58
47. See id. (noting NBA's response to Tarpley's petition for reinstatement).
48. See id. (explaining Tarpley unsuccessfully applied for reinstatement many
times).
49. Id.
50. See id. (noting Tarpley averaged sixteen points per game and ten re-
bounds per game for Michigan Mayhem, though frequently injured).
51. See id. (explaining Tarpley stopped playing for Michigan Mayhem because
team disbanded).
52. See id. (noting Tarpley was unemployed and forty-one when team
disbanded).
53. See Tarpley Sues Team, supra note 12 (noting Tarpley's filing of EEOC
claim).
54. See Associated Press, supra note 2 (explaining EEOC sided with Tarpley in
May 2007).
55. See id. (stating EEOC issued right to sue letter after mediation failed).
56. See Tarply Sues Team, supra note 12 (commenting that Tarpley filed law-
suit in federal court in Houston, Texas in September 2007).
57. See id. (describing basis for Tarpley's lawsuit). Tarpley's lawsuit states:
"Tarpley is a qualified individual with a disability within the meaning of the ADA,
in that he has a disability in the form of past drug and alcohol abuse, which sub-
stantially limits at least one of his major life activities." Id.
58. See id. ("What he went through and the hoops that he went through to
comply with what the NBA wanted and how the NBA treated him was just down-
right wrong, unfair, and cruel. We're making the NBA and the Mavericks account-
able for the way they treated him.").
Vol. 15: p. 333
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TARPLEY'S NBA DISCRIMINATION CLAIM
Tarpley stated that his objectives are to clear his name and to help
others that suffer from alcoholism and drug addiction. 59
In his lawsuit, Tarpley contends that the NBA dismissed him
from the league in 1995 for testing positive for alcohol with a blood
alcohol level of approximately 0.003 percent, a very low result con-
sidering that Texas defines a driver as intoxicated with a minimum
blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent.60 The lawsuit also notes that
Tarpley passed all alcohol and drug tests that the NBA required
him to take pursuant to his application for reinstatement to the
league. 61 The lawsuit did not specify the amount of money Tarpley
is seeking, 62 but he sought at least $6.5 million in his original EEOC
complaint. 6 3
B. Americans with Disabilities Act
1. Legislative History of Americans with Disabilities Act
In 1990, Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act,
the United States' first civil rights act to target the needs of individ-
uals with disabilities. 64 Congress found that the law was necessary
given the history of discrimination against the disabled in the
United States. 65 Congress's goal was to ensure that disabled individ-
uals receive equal opportunities and attain social and economic in-
59. See Associated Press, supra note 2 ("Right now it's about me getting my
name back and being able to help someone else who's struggling with issues.").
60. See Tarpley Sues Team, supra note 12 (explaining NBA banned Tarpley for
failing alcohol test and emphasizing Tarpley's extremely low test result).
61. See id. (stating Tarpley passed NBA requested alcohol and drug tests for
fifty-two weeks).
62. See id. (noting Tarpley did not specify dollar amount in lawsuit).
63. See Associated Press, supra note 2 (listing amount Tarpley sought in EEOC
complaint).
64. See EEOC and Title I of the ADA: Overview and History, http://www.eeoc.
gov/ada/adahistory.html (last visited May 1, 2008) ("[T]he Americans with Disa-
bilities Act (ADA) is the first comprehensive civil rights law addressing the needs of
people with disabilities, prohibiting discrimination in employment, public services,
public accommodations, and telecommunications.").
65. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (1990) (providing Congress's findings regarding
disabled individuals). Section 12101 (a) of the Americans with Disabilities Act
states:
(1) some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental dis-
abilities... ;
(2) historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals
with disabilities .... ;
(3) discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such crit-
ical areas as employment, housing, public accommodations, education,
transportation, communication, recreation, institutionalization, health
services, voting, and access to public services;
(4) unlike individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis
of race, color, sex, national original, religion, or age, individuals who
2008]
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dependence. 66 Accordingly, the ADA's purpose is to provide a law
with clear standards to eliminate discrimination against individuals
with disabilities. 67
2. Employment Under Americans with Disabilities Act
The ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating against
an individual with a disability in regard to hiring, promotion, termi-
nation, compensation, training, conditions, and privileges of em-
ployment. 68 A prima facie ADA claim has three requirements. 69
First, the plaintiff must have been "disabled within the meaning of
the ADA."'70 Second, the plaintiff must have been "qualified to per-
have experienced discrimination on the basis of disability have often had
no legal recourse to redress such discrimination;
(5) individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of
discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion.... ;
(6) census data, national polls, and other studies have documented that
people with disabilities, as a group, occupy an inferior status in our soci-
ety, and are severely disadvantaged socially, vocationally, economically,
and educationally;
(7) individuals with disabilities.., have been faced with restrictions and
limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and
relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society, based on
characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals and result-
ing from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual
ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society;
Id. §§ 12101 (a)(1)-(7).
66. See id. § 12101 (a) (8) ("[T]he Nation's proper goals regarding individuals
with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, indepen-
dent living, and economic self-sufficiency .... ").
67. See id. §§ 12101 (b)(1)-(2) ("It is the purpose of this [Act] - (1) to provide
a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities; [and] (2) to provide clear, strong, consistent,
enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabili-
ties . . . "). The ADA's other purposes are:
(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforc-
ing the standards established in this [Act] on behalf of individuals with
disabilities; and
(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power
to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in or-
der to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by peo-
ple with disabilities.
Id. §§ 12101(b)(3)-(4).
68. See id. § 12112(a) ("No [employer] shall discriminate against a qualified
individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to
job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees,
employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges
of employment.").
69. See Bailey v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 306 F.3d 1162, 1166 (1st Cir. 2002)
(listing requirements of prima facie ADA claim that plaintiff must prove by pre-
ponderance of evidence).
70. Id. For a further discussion of the definition of a disability under the
ADA, see infra notes 73-123 and accompanying text.
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TARPLEY'S NBA DISCRIMINATION CLAIM
form the... job .... ,,71 Third, the employer must have taken "ad-
verse action against [the plaintiff] because of the disability."72
a. Disability
The first element a plaintiff must establish is that he or she is
disabled. 73 The ADA defines a disability as: "(A) a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the ma-
jor life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impair-
ment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment."74
i. Impairment that Substantially Limits a Major Life Activity
The court applies a three-part test to determine whether the
plaintiff is disabled within the ADA's first definition of a disability.75
First, the plaintiff's condition must constitute a mental or physical
impairment under the ADA.76 The court reviews past case law and
the ADA's legislative history to ascertain whether the condition is a
mental or physical impairment. 77 Second, the plaintiff's limited ac-
tivity must constitute a major life activity. 78 An activity is a major life
activity if it is "of central importance to daily life." 79 Third, the im-
71. Bailey, 306 F.3d at 1166. For a further discussion of the definition of a
qualified individual under the ADA, see infra notes 124-29 and accompanying text.
72. Bailey, 306 F.3d at 1166. For a further discussion of the adverse action
requirement, see infra notes 130-35 and accompanying text.
73. See Bailey, 306 F.3d at 1166 (listing disability as first requirement in prima
facie ADA claim).
74. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2)(A)-(C) (1990).
75. See Bailey, 306 F.3d at 1167 (applying three-part test to determine whether
plaintiff is disabled under ADA's first definition of disability).
76. See id. ("First, we consider whether [the plaintiff's] condition constitutes a
mental or physical 'impairment."').
77. See generally id. (referring to past cases and legislative history to prove
whether plaintiff's condition satisfies first prong of analysis). A physical or mental
impairment is:
(1) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neu-
rological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including
speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary,
hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or
(2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, or-
ganic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning
disabilities.
29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(h)(1)-(2) (2007).
78. See Bailey, 306 F.3d at 1167 ("Second, we identify the life activities upon
which [the plaintiff] relies to determine whether they constitute 'major life
activities.'").
79. Id. "Major Life Activities means functions such as caring for oneself, per-
forming manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and
working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i).
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pairment must substantially limit the major life activity.80 Substan-
tially limited means "unable to perform" or "significantly
restricted.""'
Drug addiction is a mental or physical impairment under the
ADA.82 Nevertheless, the ADA provides limited protection for drug
addicts. 83 The ADA does not protect an individual who was using
illegal drugs at the time the employer took adverse action. 84
Alcoholism is also a mental or physical impairment under the
ADA.85 In contrast to drug addicts, the ADA does not automatically
deny protection to an individual who was using alcohol at the time
of the employer's adverse action;86 however, the ADA still provides
limited protection for alcoholics. 87 Alcoholism is not a per se disa-
bility.88 Consequently, an alcoholic must demonstrate that alcohol-
ism substantially limits a major life activity.89 An alcoholic's
inability to walk, speak, think, drive, or sleep while intoxicated does
80. See Bailey, 306 F.3d at 1167 ("Third, we must determine whether the im-
pairment substantially limits the major life activity identified.").
81. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i). When determining whether an impairment
substantially limits a major life activity, the court considers factors such as: "(i)
[t]he nature and severity of the impairment; (ii) [t]he duration or expected dura-
tion of the impairment; and (iii) [t]he permanent or long-term impact, or the
expected permanent or long term impact of . . . the impairment." Id.
§§ 1630.2(j)(2) (i)-(iii).
82. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 12114 (1990) (providing limited coverage of drug
addicts).
83. See id. §§ 12114(a)-(d) (explaining limitations for drug addicts under
ADA).
84. See id. § 12114(a) ("'[Q]ualified individual with a disability' shall not in-
clude any employee or applicant who is currently engaging in the illegal use of
drugs, when the [employer] acts on the basis of such use."); U.S. EQUAL EMPLOY-
MENT OPP'TY. COMM'N. & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT:
QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 10 (1992) [hereinafter QUESTIONS AND ANswERs] (explain-
ing that ADA does not protect individuals currently using drugs).
85. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 12114 (providing limited coverage of alcoholics).
86. See Alan M. Koral, Litigating ADA (Title I) Discrimination and Accommodation
Cases, in 759 PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, LITIGATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE
COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, LITIGATION 365, 369 (2007) ("Unlike an illegal drug
user, an employee who is currently abusing alcohol is not automatically denied
protection under the ADA because of her alcohol use."); see also QUESTIONS AND
ANswERs, supra note 84, at 10 (explaining ADA's coverage of alcoholics).
87. See 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c) (1990) (listing restrictions on alcoholics under
ADA); see also Goldsmith v. Jackson Mem'l Hosp. Pub. Health Trust, 33 F. Supp. 2d
1336, 1341 (S.D. Fla. 1998) ("Although alcoholics may be detrimentally impacted
in many facets of their lives by their addiction, the ADA requires an individualized
determination of impact, not simply an assumption.").
88. See Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 316 (5th Cir. 1997) (rejecting
alcoholism as per se disability unlike HIV, which court automatically considers dis-
ability without proof that it substantially limits major life activity).
89. See Goldsmith, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 1342 (requiring plaintiff to prove alcohol-
ism substantially limited major life activity).
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not establish that alcoholism substantially limits a major life activity
because the same temporary consequences could result if the alco-
hol consumer was not an alcoholic.90 Even though an alcoholic
may experience these alcohol-induced limitations more frequently
than a social drinker, the limitations are not sufficient because the
impairment is not permanent.9 1 Conversely, an alcoholic can prove
that alcoholism substantially limits a major life activity by demon-
strating that alcoholism permanently affects the ability to walk,
think, speak, drive, or sleep, even when sober.9 2
The EEOC is reluctant to regard working as a major life activ-
ity, but it may do so if the individual is not substantially limited in
any other major life activity.93 Substantially limited in regard to
working means the individual is limited in performing a class of
jobs or a broad range ofjobs compared to an individual with similar
training, skill, and ability.9 4 When determining whether an impair-
ment substantially limits an individual's ability to work, the court
looks to factors such as: the geographical area where the individual
is able to work, the number and type of jobs requiring similar skill
that the individual is precluded from performing, and the number
and type ofjobs not requiring similar skill that the individual is pre-
90. See Burch, 119 F.3d at 316 (comparing alcoholic to social drinker); see also
Goldsmith, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 1342 (holding plaintiff's inability to socialize, drive,
and perform manual tasks while drinking were inadequate because they were
temporary).
[Plaintiff] produced no evidence that the effects of his alcoholism-in-
duced inebriation were qualitatively different than those achieved by an
overindulging social drinker: in both situations, the natural result of over-
indulgence is the temporary impairment of senses, dulled reactions, and
the prospect of a restless sleep followed by an unpleasant morning.
Burch, 119 F.3d at 316.
91. See Burch, 119 F.3d at 316 (emphasizing court's focus on permanency, not
frequency).
92. See id. at 316 n.9 ("[Plaintiff] offered no testimony that his alcoholism-
induced inebriation permanently altered his gait, his ability to speak properly, his
memory when sober, or produced long-term insomnia.").
93. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2007) (listing working as major life activity);
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 492 (1999) ("[T]he EEOC has ex-
pressed reluctance to define 'major life activities' to include working and has sug-
gested that working be viewed as a residual life activity, considered, as a last resort,
only '[i] f an individual is not substantially limited in any other major life activity.'"
(emphasis added) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (1998))).
94. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (3) (i) ("[S]ubstantially limits means significantly
restricted in the ability to perform either a class ofjobs or a broad range ofjobs in
various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training,
skills and abilities."); Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492 ("To be substantially limited in the
major life activity of working, then, one must be precluded from more than one
type of job, a specialized job, or a particular job of choice.").
2008]
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cluded from performing. 95 An individual is not precluded from a
class of jobs if jobs are available that utilize the individual's skills,
but not necessarily a unique talent.9 6 Likewise, an individual is not
precluded from a broad range ofjobs if numerousjobs are available
that the individual is able to perform.9 7
ii. Record of a Disability
The court ascertains whether the plaintiff has a record of an
impairment that substantially limited a major life activity to deter-
mine whether the plaintiff is disabled within the ADA's second defi-
nition of a disability. 98 The record must illustrate that the
impairment substantially limited a major life activity; a record of an
impairment alone is insufficient.99
The purpose of including individuals with an established re-
cord of a disability is to protect those who have recovered from an
impairment that substantially limited a major life activity from dis-
crimination because of their past impairment. 100 Hence, the ADA
does not exclude from its protections a successfully rehabilitated
individual who no longer abuses drugs or an individual currently in
rehabilitation who no longer uses drugs. 10 1 An individual must ab-
stain from drug use for a considerable period, however, before the
ADA protects the individual. 10 2
The court requires actual documentation of the impairment to
constitute a record.1 0 3 For instance, medical, educational, employ-
95. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(j) (3) (ii) (A)-(C) (listing three factors courts use to
determine if impairment substantially limits working).
96. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492 (explaining situation when individual is not
precluded from class of jobs).
97. See id. (explaining situation when individual is not precluded from broad
range of jobs).
98. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) (2007) ("Has a record of such impairment
means has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.").
99. See Bailey v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 306 F.3d 1162, 1169 (1st Cir. 2002)
(requiring record to show impairment substantially limited major life activity).
100. See id. ("The purpose of this provision is largely to protect those who
have recovered or are recovering from substantially limiting impairments from dis-
crimination based on their medical history.").
101. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12114(b)(1)-(2) (1990) (including past drug users
under ADA protection).
102. See Koral, supra note 86, at 369 ("An addict must abstain for a significant
period of time in order to qualify for ADA protection.").
103. See EEOC v. Exxon Corp., 124 F. Supp. 2d 987, 996 (N.D. Tex. 2000)
(requiring documentation of history of impairment). "The plaintiffs' declarations
merely recount their past problems with substance abuse, and in no way suggest
the existence of a 'record' . . . that classifies ... these plaintiffs as having a substan-
tially limiting impairment." Id.
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ment, treatment, counseling, or hospital records can establish a suf-
ficient record.1 0 4 The record still must indicate that the individual
had an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity. 10 5
In School Board Of Nassau County v. Arline, for example, the Su-
preme Court held that the plaintiffs hospital stay was a sufficient
record because it indicated that her tuberculosis was interfering
with her breathing.'0 6 "This impairment was serious enough to re-
quire hospitalization, a fact more than sufficient to establish that
one or more of her major life activities were substantially limited by
her impairment. '" 10 7 In contrast, in Goldsmith v. Jackson Memorial
Hospital Public Health Trust, a Florida District Court held that the
plaintiff's sporadic attendance at Alcoholics Anonymous meetings
was not a sufficient record.1 08 History of treatment only constitutes
a sufficient record if it demonstrates that the impairment substan-
tially limited a major life activity. 10 9
iii. Regarded as Having a Disability
The court relies on Sutton v. United Air Lines to determine
whether the plaintiff is disabled within the ADA's third definition of
a disability.I 10 In Sutton, the Supreme Court listed two ways an indi-
vidual can be regarded as having a disability.' 1  First, an individual
can be regarded as having a disability if an employer believes that
the individual has an impairment that substantially limits a major
life activity, when in fact, the individual does not have an impair-
ment at all. 112 Second, an individual can be regarded as having a
104. See id. (listing records plaintiff failed to provide and thus did not meet
burden of proving record of impairment).
105. See Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 321-22 (5th Cir. 1999) (stating
record of treatment alone does not prove disability).
106. See 480 U.S. 273, 281-82 (1987) (finding hospital stay sufficient record
because tuberculosis was affecting breathing). "[The plaintiff] suffered tuberculo-
sis 'in an acute form in such a degree that it affected her respiratory system,' and
was hospitalized for this condition." Id. at 281.
107. Id.
108. See 33 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1342 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (emphasizing record must
prove impairment substantially limited major life activity).
109. See id. ("History of treatment does not.., establish that alcoholism sub-
stantially impacted a major life activity.").
110. See 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999) (examining third definition of disability
under ADA).
111. See id. (listing two ways individual can be regarded has having impair-
ment); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(l) (1)-(3) (2007) (defining "regarded as having such an
impairment").
112. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489 ("[An employer] mistakenly believes that an
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disability if an employer believes that the individual has an impair-
ment that substantially limits a major life activity, when the individ-
ual actually has an impairment that does not substantially limit a
major life activity.1 13 In sum, the ADA prohibits an employer from
using an individual's disability, real or perceived, as a factor when
making employment decisions."14
If an individual claims that the employer regards the individual
as limited in the ability to work, the court requires the same stan-
dard as when an individual alleges a limitation in the ability to
work.' 15 The employer must regard the individual as limited in the
ability to perform a class ofjobs or a broad range ofjobs, not just a
particular job. 116 For example, in Moorer v. Baptist Memorial Health
Care System, the Sixth Circuit found that an employer's belief that
the plaintiffs alcoholism rendered him unable to perform his job
as a hospital administrator met the requisite burden." 17 The court
reasoned that the job of hospital administrator requires strong
managerial skills, and a broad range ofjobs require strong manage-
rial skills. 118
In contrast, in Sutton v. United Air Lines, the Supreme Court
found that an employer's belief that the plaintiffs' poor vision pre-
cluded them from being global airline pilots did not meet the req-
uisite burden. 119 The court reasoned that global airline pilots
113. See id. ("[An employer] mistakenly believes that a person has a physical
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities ....").
114. See id. at 490 ("An employer runs afoul of the ADA when it makes an
employment decision based on a physical or mental impairment, real or imagined,
that is regarded as substantially limiting a major life activity.").
115. Compare Zenor v. El Paso Healthcare Sys., Ltd., 176 F.3d 847, 861 (5th
Cir. 1999) (requiring plaintiff to show employer regarded him or her as precluded
from performing class of jobs or broad range of jobs) with 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.20)(3)(i) (2007) (requiring individual to show he or she was precluded
from performing class of jobs or broad range of jobs).
116. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(3)(i) (explaining how individual can be sub-
stantially limited in ability to work).
117. See 398 F.3d 469, 484 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding employer's belief that
plaintiff was unable to perform job as hospital administrator was sufficient to prove
employer believed plaintiff was precluded from broad range of jobs).
118. See id. (finding job of hospital administrator requires strong managerial
skills and jobs requiring strong managerial skills encompass broad range of jobs).
The fact that [the employer] believed that [the plaintiff's] alcoholism
made him unable to perform his hospital administrator job, which re-
quired a broad range of managerial skills, permits the reasonable infer-
ence that [the employer] believed that [the plaintiffs] alcoholism
rendered him incapable of performing a substantial number of manage-
rial jobs.
Id.
119. See 527 U.S. 471, 494 (1999) (explaining plaintiffs' claim that employer
believed their poor vision precluded them from being global airline pilots did not
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encompass a single job, not a class or broad range of jobs. 120 The
court noted that the plaintiffs could utilize their skills in a number
of other occupations, including regional pilots and flight instruc-
tors. 12 1 Similarly, in Zenor v. El Paso Healthcare System, the Fifth Cir-
cuit concluded that an employer's belief that the plaintiff's cocaine
addiction limited his ability to work in a pharmacy did not meet the
requisite burden.122 The court reasoned that pharmacists do not
encompass a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs.' 23
b. Qualified
The second element a plaintiff must establish is that he or she
was qualified for the particular position. 124 The court applies a two-
step test to determine whether an individual was qualified. 125 The
first step requires the individual to possess the particular position's
prerequisite qualifications.' 26 An individual can show previous em-
ployment in the same or similar position to satisfy the first step of
this analysis.' 27 The second step requires the individual to be able
prove that employer believed plaintiffs were precluded from particular class ofjobs
or broad range ofjobs).
120. See id. at 493 (finding global airline pilots do not encompass class or
broad range of jobs).
[Plaintiffs] allege only that [their employer] regards their poor vision as
precluding them from holding positions as a 'global airline pilot.' Be-
cause the position of global airline pilot is a single job, this allegation
does not support the claim that [their employer] regards [them] as hav-
ing a substantially limiting impairment.
Id.
121. See id. ("IT]here are a number of other positions utilizing [the plain-
tiffs'] skills, such as regional pilot and pilot instructor to name a few, that are
available to them.").
122. See 176 F.3d 847, 861 (5th Cir. 1999) ("[The employer] felt that a recent
cocaine addict was unqualified for one specific job: that of a pharmacist. [The
employer] was entitled to conclude that if a person is a pharmacist, cocaine addic-
tion is not acceptable.").
123. See id. (reasoning pharmacists encompass single job, not class of jobs or
broad range of jobs).
124. See Bailey v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 306 F.3d 1162, 1166 (1st Cir. 2002)
(requiring plaintiff to prove he was qualified).
125. See William H. Danne,Jr., Annotation, Who is "Qualified Individual" Under
Americans with Disabilities Provisions, 146 A.L.R. FED. 1, § 4 (1998) (explaining court
uses two-step analysis to determine whether individual is qualified).
126. See id. (" [T] he first step being to determine if the individual satisfies the
prerequisites for the position, such as possessing the appropriate educational back-
ground, employment experience, skills, licenses, etc.").
127. See McAlpin v. Nat'l Semiconductor Corp., 921 F. Supp. 1518, 1523 (N.D.
Tex. 1996) (finding plaintiff satisfied prerequisites of position because plaintiff was
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to perform the particular position's essential functions. 128 Essential
functions are functions that are more than marginally related to the
position. 129
c. Adverse Action
The third element a plaintiff must establish is that the em-
ployer took adverse action against the plaintiff because of his or her
disability. 130 The plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating a causal
connection between the employer's adverse action and the plain-
tiffs actual or perceived disability. 13'
The ADA permits an employer to take adverse action against
an alcoholic or drug addicted employee so long as the employer
would have taken the same action against any other employee for
the same conduct. 132 An employer may hold an alcoholic or drug
addicted employee to the same standards as other employees, even
if any sub par performance or inappropriate behavior is a conse-
quence of the employee's alcoholism or drug addiction. 133 In Wil-
128. See Danne, supra note 125, § 4 ("[T]he second step being to determine
whether the individual can perform the essential functions of the position.").
129. See Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1393 (5th Cir. 1993) (charac-
terizing essential functions as those that "bear more than a marginal relationship
to the job at issue"); Danne, supra note 125, § 18 (defining "essential functions").
To determine a position's essential functions, the court looks to factors such as:
(i) The employer's judgment as to which functions are essential;
(ii) Written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing
applicants for the job;
(iii) The amount of time spent on the job performing the function;
(iv) The consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the
function;
(v) The terms of a collective bargaining agreement;
(vi) The work experience of past incumbents on the job; and/or
(vii) The current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.
29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(n)(3)(i)-(vii) (2007).
130. See Bailey v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 306 F.3d 1162, 1166 (1st Cir. 2002)
(requiring plaintiff to show employer took adverse action against him because of
disability).
131. See Moorer v. Baptist Mem'l Health Care Sys., 398 F.3d 469, 484-85 (6th
Cir. 2005) (requiring plaintiff to provide evidence showing connection between
adverse action and plaintiffs disability or perceived disability).
132. See Koral, supra note 86, at 369-70 (stating employers can discipline al-
coholics for misconduct, even if misconduct is alcohol related, so long as al-
coholics do not receive harsher discipline than non-alcoholics for same
misconduct).
133. See 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(4) (1990) (noting employer does not have to
lower employment standards for alcoholic or drug addicted employees).
[An employer] may hold an employee who engages in the illegal use of
drugs or who is an alcoholic to the same qualification standards for em-
ployment or job performance and behavior that such [employer] holds
other employees, even if any unsatisfactory performance or behavior is
related to the drug use or alcoholism of such employee.
[Vol. 15: p. 333
16
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol15/iss2/4
TARPLEY'S NBA DISCRIMINATION CLAIM
liams v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., for example, a Florida District Court
found that an employer did not violate the ADA when it terminated
the alcoholic plaintiff for demeaning behavior following a corpo-
rate happy hour, even though the plaintiff claimed his alcoholism
caused his behavior. 34 The court reasoned that the employer
would have terminated any employee, regardless of alcoholic status,
for such conduct. 135
d. Burden Shifts
If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie ADA claim, the burden of
proof shifts to the employer to provide a "legitimate non-discrimi-
natory reason" for its adverse action.1 3 6 For example, in Pugh v. City
of Attica, an employer terminated the plaintiff for misappropriating
funds. 137 The court found that the employer satisfied its burden
because misappropriation of funds is a legitimate non-discrimina-
tory reason for terminating an employee. 38
If the employer provides a legitimate non-discriminatory rea-
son for its adverse action, the burden of proof shifts back to the
plaintiff.' 39 The plaintiff must then demonstrate that the em-
ployer's stated reason for its adverse action is merely a pretext for
discrimination.1 40 In Moorer v. Baptist Memorial Health Care Services,
Id. Further, the ADA permits employers to prohibit all employees from using alco-
hol or illegal drugs at the workplace and to require that all employees refrain from
being under the influence of alcohol or engaging in illegal drug use at the work-
place. See id. §§ 12114(c)(1)-(2) (listing measures regarding alcoholics and drug
addicts that ADA permits). The ADA also allows employers to test its applicants
and employees for drugs and make employment decisions based on the test re-
sults. See generally id. § 12114(d) (2) (noting ADA does not prohibit employer from
making decisions based on drug test results); see also QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS,
supra note 84, at 10 (describing drug measures that ADA permits).
134. See 957 F. Supp. 1246, 1250 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (explaining employer termi-
nated plaintiff for misconduct, not because of alcoholism).
135. See id. (finding employer did not violate ADA because it did not disci-
pline alcoholic plaintiff any differently than it would discipline non-alcoholic em-
ployee for same conduct).
136. See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 50 (2003) (explaining bur-
den shifts to employer to provide legitimate non-discriminatory reason for adverse
action if plaintiff demonstrates prima facie ADA claim).
137. See 259 F.3d 619, 628-29 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating employer terminated
plaintiff for misappropriating funds).
138. See id. at 629 (holding employer met requisite burden because misappro-
priation of funds is legitimate non-discriminatory reason for terminating
employee).
139. See Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1185-86 (6th Cir.
1996) (noting burden returns to plaintiff if employer provides legitimate non-dis-
criminatory reason for adverse action).
140. See id. (requiring plaintiff to prove employer's legitimate non-discrimina-
tory reason for adverse action is pretext for discrimination).
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for example, an employer claimed that it terminated the plaintiff
based on a fire marshal's report of a workplace fire hazard; how-
ever, the fire marshal had no record of such report.1 41 The em-
ployer also claimed that it terminated the plaintiff because the state
health facilities commission had reported concerns of workplace
deficiencies; however, the state health facilities commission did not
conduct a survey of the workplace until after the employer termi-
nated the plaintiff.142 Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiff
satisfied its burden of demonstrating a pretext because of the in-
consistencies in the employer's proffered reasons for terminating
the plaintiff.143
C. National Basketball Players Association Anti-Drug Policy
The National Basketball Players Association ("NBPA") collec-
tive bargaining agreement prohibits players from using "drugs of
abuse," marijuana, steroids, performance enhancing drugs, or di-
uretics.' 44 The NBA enforces this policy in a number of different
ways. 14 5
1. Reasonable Cause Testing
If the NBA or NBPA receives information that leads it to be-
lieve that a player is using, possessing, or distributing a prohibited
substance, the NBA and NBPA will hold a meeting with an expert,
independent of the league, to determine whether the belief is rea-
sonable.1 46 If the expert concludes that the belief is reasonable, the
NBA is then authorized to test the player for prohibited sub-
141. See 398 F.3d 469, 481 (6th Cir. 2005) (explaining plaintiff proved em-
ployer's first reason for terminating plaintiff was pretext for discrimination).
142. See id. at 482 (illustrating plaintiff proved employer's second reason for
terminating plaintiff was pretext for discrimination).
143. See id. at 485 (explaining court affirmed district court's finding of dis-
crimination because plaintiff met burden of proving pretext by showing inconsis-
tencies in employer's alleged reason for terminating plaintiff).
144. See NAT'L BASKETBALL PLAYERS AsS'N, COLLECTIVF BARGAINING AGREE-
MENT, Exh. 1-2 (July 29, 2005), available at http://www.nbpa.com/cba-exhibits/
exhibitl-2.php (prohibiting "drugs of abuse," marijuana, steroids and performance
enhancing drugs, and diuretics). "Drugs of abuse" include amphetamines, co-
caine, LSD, opiates, and PCP. Id.
145. See generally Art. XXXIII, supra note 8, §§ 5, 6, 7 & 14 (listing several
methods NBA uses to enforce anti-drug policy).
146. See id. § 5(a) (describing how NBA and NBPA determine whether belief
is reasonable).
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stances. 147 If the player tests positive for a "drug[ ] of abuse," the
NBA will immediately dismiss the player from the league. 4
2. Random Drug Testing
The NBA also enforces its anti-drug policy through random
drug testing. 149 An independent third party conducts the selection
of players and the scheduling of the random drug tests. 150 If a
player tests positive for a "drug[ ] of abuse," the NBA will immedi-
ately dismiss the player from the league. 15 1
3. Drugs of Abuse Program
Further, the NBA enforces its anti-drug policy through the
Drugs of Abuse Program.1 52 A player can voluntarily enter the pro-
gram to seek help, or the league can mandate a player to enter the
program. 153 The program may require the player to enter in-pa-
tient and aftercare programs and to submit to random testing for
alcohol and other prohibited substances.1 54
The Drugs of Abuse Program has two stages.1 55 The stages
only differ in how the NBA disciplines a player for violating the
terms of the program. 156 If a player tests positive for a "drug[ ] of
abuse" while in the first stage of the program, the player moves to
the second stage of the program. 57 If a player tests positive for a
147. See id. § 5(b) (describing consequences if expert finds belief is
reasonable).
148. See id. § 5(d) (providing NBA will dismiss any player who played in
league for one year or more for failing reasonable belief drug test). "A player who
... is 'dismissed...' shall, without exception, immediately be so dismissed... for a
period of not less than two years ... dismissal ... shall be mandatory and may not
be rescinded or reduced . . . ." Id. § 11 (a).
149. See generally id. § 6(a) (including random drug testing as means for en-
forcing anti-drug policy).
150. See id. § 6(a) (explaining third party organization conducts scheduling of
drug tests and urine sample collection).
151. See id. § 6(c) (stating NBA will dismiss any player who has played in
league for one year or more for failing random drug test).
152. See generally id. § 7 (listing Drugs of Abuse Program as means to enforce
anti-drug policy).
153. See id. § 7(a) (stating player can voluntarily enter program); id. §14(c)
(explaining NBA can force player to enter program).
154. See id. § 7(d) (providing treatment and testing requirements of
program).
155. See id. §§ 7(b)-(c), (describing program's two steps).
156. See id. (explaining stages only differ in consequences of violating terms
of program).
157. See id. § 10(a) (2) (i) (explaining failed drug test in stage one results in
moving to stage two).
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"drug[ ] of abuse" while in the second stage of the program, the
NBA will immediately dismiss the player from the league.
58
4. Additional Bases for Drug Testing
The collective bargaining agreement also provides additional
bases for drug testing to enforce the league's anti-drug policy.
159 If
a player seeks outside treatment for problems with a prohibited
substance, the NBA can mandate drug testing. 160 If a player in the
Drugs of Abuse Program is charged with a crime involving alcohol
or an illegal substance, the NBA will mandate drug testing.16 1 If a
player tests positive for a "drug [ ] of abuse," the NBA will force the
player to enter the second stage of the Drugs of Abuse Program;
however, if the player has already entered the Drugs of Abuse Pro-
gram, regardless of the stage, the NBA will immediately dismiss the
player from the league.1
6 2
5. Reinstatement
A dismissed player can apply for reinstatement to the NBA two
years after the dismissal.' 63 To be considered for reinstatement, the
player must prove that he has remained drug-free for the previous
twelve months, and, in addition, the player may also have to prove
that he has remained alcohol-free for the previous six months.
164
158. See id. § 10(a) (2) (ii) (stating failed drug test in stage two results in dis-
missal from league).
159. See generally id. § 14 (listing additional bases for testing beyond reasona-
ble belief testing, random testing, and Drugs of Abuse Program).
160. See id. § 14(a) (explaining NBA may require any player in outside treat-
ment for prohibited substance to submit to drug testing).
161. See id. § 14(b) (describing consequence if player in Drugs of Abuse Pro-
gram is charged with alcohol or drug related offense). "Any player who is subject
to in-patient care or aftercare treatment in the Program and is formally charged
with . .. any... crime or offense involving suspected alcohol or illegal substance
use shall .. .be required to submit to a urine test . . . ." Id.
162. See id. § 14(c) (explaining consequences if player tests positive for
"drug[ ] of abuse").
163. See id. § 12(a) (noting when player can apply for reinstatement).
164. See id. § 12(b) (providing reinstatement requirements).
[T]he NBA and [NBPA] will consider any application for reinstatement
only if the player can demonstrate, by proof of random urine testing ac-
ceptable to the Medical Director (conducted on at least a weekly basis),
that he has not tested positive (i) for a Prohibited Substance within the
twelve (12) months prior to the submission of his application and during
any period while his application for reinstatement is being reviewed, and
(ii) if the Medical Director deems it necessary in his or her professional
judgment, for alcohol for the six (6) months prior to the submission of
his application for reinstatement and during any period while his applica-
tion is being reviewed.
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When determining whether to reinstate a player, the NBA and
NBPA consider factors such as: the circumstances of the player's
dismissal; the player's success in a rehabilitation or treatment pro-
gram; the player's conduct after dismissal, in particular the extent
to which the player has served as a role model; and the player's
character and morality.' 65 No player has a right to reinstatement,
but the NBA and NBPA may not unreasonably deny reinstate-
ment. 166 The NBA and NBPA hold all discretion in granting or
refusing reinstatement, and their decision is final and unappeala-
ble. 167 Furthermore, the NBA and NBPA may condition a player's
reinstatement upon random alcohol and drug testing.
168
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF TARPLEY'S CLAIM
Roy Tarpley must meet a high burden to win his claim that the
NBA violated the ADA when it refused to reinstate him in 2003.169
Tarpley must prove that he was disabled under the ADA, that he
was qualified to play in the NBA, and that the NBA refused to rein-
state him because of his disability.1
70
A. Was Tarpley Disabled?
Tarpley must prove that he has a record of a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limited a major life activity or that the
NBA regarded him as having such an impairment to be disabled
under the ADA. 17 1 The ADA regards both alcoholism and drug ad-
diction as mental or physical impairments. 172 Therefore, the ques-
165. See id. § 12(a) (listing factors NBA and NBPA consider when deciding
whether to grant reinstatement).
166. See id. (delineating rights of dismissed player and scope of NBA's and
NBPA's discretion).
167. See id. (stating NBA and NBPA have exclusive discretion). The NBA and
NBPA must both approve the reinstatement of a dismissed player. See id. (noting
requirement of approval from NBA and NBPA for reinstatement).
168. See id. § 12(c) (articulating NBA and NBPA may condition reinstatement
on random drug testing or other similar requirement).
169. See Koral, supra note 86, at 369 (explaining alcoholics must meet high
burden to receive ADA protection).
170. See Bailey v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 306 F.3d 1162, 1166 (1st Cir. 2002)
(listing prima facie ADA claim requirements). For a further discussion of a prima
facie ADA claim, see supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
171. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1990) (defining disability with respect to indi-
vidual under ADA).
172. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 12114 (providing limited coverage to alcoholics
and drug addicts); see also QUESTIONS AND ANswERs, supra note 84, at 10 (explain-
ing ADA's coverage of alcoholics and drug addicts). For a further discussion of
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tion is whether Tarpley has a record that illustrates that his
alcoholism and drug addiction substantially limited a major life ac-
tivity, or whether the NBA regarded Tarpley as substantially limited
in a major life activity due to his history of alcoholism and drug
addiction. 173
1. Did Tarpley Have a Record of a Disability?
Tarpley must establish a record demonstrating that his alcohol-
ism and drug addiction substantially limited a major life activity to
successfully claim a record of a disability. 174 Tarpley can attempt to
use his alcohol and drug counseling and treatment, his arrests, and
his suspensions and dismissals as a record that his addictions sub-
stantially limited his ability to work. 175 The court is unlikely to find
that Tarpley's counseling and treatment in the late-1980s are an
adequate record because Tarpley's NBA career was flourishing dur-
ing this time. 176 Tarpley's thriving career establishes that his alco-
holism and drug addiction did not substantially limit his ability to
play basketball. 177 The court is also not likely to find that Tarpley's
two arrests are an adequate record because incarceration is short-
term. 78 Furthermore, the court will not likely find Tarpley's sus-
pensions adequate because the suspensions, like his incarceration,
were short-term.1 79 Thus, Tarpley will probably not succeed in
proving that he has a record of an impairment that substantially
173. See42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2) (B)-(C) (defining disability with respect to indi-
vidual under ADA).
174. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) (2007) (defining "has a record of such an im-
pairment"). In his lawsuit, Tarpley does not claim that he was disabled as an alco-
holic or drug addict in 2003; he claims that he was recovering from alcoholism and
drug abuse. See Tarpley Sues Team, supra note 12 (detailing Tarpley's legal claim).
Therefore, determining whether Tarpley's impairment falls within the first defini-
tion of a disability is unnecessary because it only applies to individuals that are
currently impaired. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (A) (providing first defini-
tion of disability applies to currently impaired individuals). For a further discus-
sion of a record of impairment, see supra notes 98-109 and accompanying text.
175. See Tarpley, Addiction, supra note 1 (describing Tarpley's troublesome
NBA career); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (finding working may constitute major
life activity).
176. See Tarpley, Addiction, supra note 1 (noting that Tarpley sought counsel-
ing and treatment when playing well in NBA).
177. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(j)(1)(i)-(ii) (defining "substantially limits" as
"[u]nable to perform" or "[s]ignificantly restricted").
178. See Bailey v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 306 F.3d 1162, 1169 (1st Cir. 2002)
(explaining incarceration did not demonstrate inability to perform broad range of
jobs because it was temporary).
179. See id. (emphasizing limitation must be permanent).
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limited his ability to work.' 80 Tarpley may still be able to claim that
he was substantially limited in a major life activity other than work-
ing, but that may be particularly difficult for an alcoholic or drug
addict because of the court's emphasis on permanency.' 8'
2. Did the NBA Regard Tarpley as Disabled?
Tarpley must prove that the NBA mistakenly believed that his
status as a recovering alcoholic and drug addict substantially limited
a major life activity to successfully claim that the NBA regarded him
as disabled. 18 2 Tarpley can claim that the NBA mistakenly believed
that his status as a recovering alcoholic and drug addict substan-
tially limited his ability to work.'18 3 Tarpley must prove that the
NBA believed that he was unable to perform either a class ofjobs or
a broad range of jobs, not just a particular job. 84
Tarpley can claim that the NBA perceived him as unable to
perform as an NBA player. 185 The court, however, probably will not
find that NBA players encompass a class of jobs because these
highly skilled athletes utilize a unique talent, similar to global air-
line pilots and pharmacists, which are both single jobs, not a class
of jobs or broad range of jobs. 186 Furthermore, Tarpley had other
positions available to him that would have allowed him to utilize his
180. See id. (requiring that record show impairment substantially limited ma-
jor life activity).
181. Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 316 n.9 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting
alcoholic's short-term limitations were inadequate). For a further discussion of
alcoholism limiting a major life activity, see supra notes 85-92 and accompanying
text.
182. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(1)(1)-(3) (2007) (defining "regarded as having
such an impairment"). Tarpley passed all alcohol and drug tests for the four years
before he applied for reinstatement. See Tarpley Sues Team, supra note 12 (noting
Tarpley remained alcohol and drug free before applying for reinstatement).
Therefore, determining whether the NBA mistakenly believed that Tarpley's alco-
hol and drug abuse substantially limited a major life activity or whether the NBA
correctly believed that Tarpley abused alcohol and drugs but mistakenly believed
that the abuse substantially limited a major life activity is unnecessary. See Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489-90 (1999) (explaining how employer can
regard employee as disabled). For a further discussion of being regarded as dis-
abled, see supra notes 110-23 and accompanying text.
183. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492 (noting EEOC regards working as major life
activity if individual is not substantially limited in any other major life activity).
184. See Zenor v. El Paso Health Care Sys., Ltd., 176 F.3d 847, 861 (5th Cir.
1999) (explaining plaintiff failed burden because plaintiff did not produce evi-
dence that employer regarded him as limited in broad range ofjobs).
185. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (3) (i) (referring to "class of jobs" as those utiliz-
ing similar training, knowledge, and skill).
186. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492 (holding global airline pilots do not encom-
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unique basketball skills.187 For example, Tarpley could have
coached basketball or played professional basketball in a different
league.188 Consequently, Tarpley will probably not be able to prove
that the NBA regarded him as limited in his ability to work.189
B. Was Tarpley Qualified?
Tarpley must demonstrate that he satisfied the NBA's prerequi-
sites and that he could perform the essential functions of an NBA
player to prove that he was qualified to be an NBA player. 190 The
NBA previously employed Tarpley as a professional basketball
player so the court will find that Tarpley satisfied the league's pre-
requisites. 191 Therefore, the question is whether Tarpley was able
to perform the essential functions of an NBA player in 2003.1,12
1. Was Tarpley Physically Capable?
The foremost essential function of an NBA player is playing
basketball at the NBA level, arguably the world's highest level. 193
Tarpley must demonstrate that he was physically capable of playing
basketball at the NBA level in 2003 to prove that he was qualified.194
Tarpley can claim that his performance in other professional
basketball leagues demonstrates that he was qualified to play NBA
187. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 493 (1999) (listing
other available jobs that utilize plaintiffs' skills to support claim that airline pilots
do not encompass class of jobs).
188. See Tarpley, Addiction, supra note 1 (noting Tarpley played professional
basketball in Greece and CBL).
189. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (3) (i) (2007) (requiring employer to preclude
individual from performing "class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various clas-
ses" in order for employer to regard individual as substantially limited in ability to
work).
190. See Danne, supra note 125, § 4 (stating two-step analysis that courts have
consistently applied to determine if individual is "qualified" under ADA). For a
further discussion of the definition of a qualified individual under the ADA, see
supra notes 124-29 and accompanying text.
191. See McAlpin v. Nat'l Semiconductor Corp., 921 F. Supp. 1518, 1523 (N.D.
Tex. 1996) (concluding plaintiff satisfied prerequisites of position because she was
satisfactorily employed in same position for almost two years prior to reporting
impairment).
192. See Bailey v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 306 F.3d 1162, 1166 (1st Cir. 2002)
(requiring individual to be qualified to satisfy prima facie ADA claim).
193. See Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1393 (5th Cir. 1993) (defining
"essential functions" as "functions that bear more than a marginal relationship to
the job at issue").
194. See Danne, supra note 125, § 4 (requiring individual to perform essential
functions of job at issue).
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basketball. 95 Tarpley's performance in the CBL may support the
argument that he had the ability to play basketball in the NBA; how-
ever, his CBL performance is not conclusive because the CBL's req-
uisite skill level is inferior to the NBA's. 196 Likewise, Tarpley's
performance in Greece is not conclusive because that league's req-
uisite skill level is also inferior to the NBA's. 197 The inquiry will
concentrate on whether Tarpley could play basketball at the NBA
level in 2003.198
Tarpley can seek help from former NBA coach, John Lucas
("Lucas"), to prove that he was able to play NBA basketball in
2003.199 Lucas helped Tarpley enter an alcohol and drug recovery
program,2 0 0 and avidly fought for his reinstatement. 20 1 In 2005, Lu-
cas stated, "[s] kill-wise, absolutely [he could play in the NBA]. He
could be a nice guy off the bench."20 2 As a man with vast knowl-
edge of both the NBA and alcohol and drug rehabilitation, Lucas
could provide strong support for Tarpley in proving that he was
qualified to play in the NBA in 2003.203
The NBA can counter that Tarpley was not qualified to play
NBA basketball because of his age and proneness to injury. 204 In
2003, Tarpley was thirty-eight years old and had a history of serious
195. See Tarpley, Addiction, supra note 1 (stating Tarpley played professional
basketball in CBL and Greece).
196. See id. (explaining Tarpley played basketball in CBL after NBA refused to
reinstate him). For a further discussion of Tarpley's experience in the CBL, see
supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
197. See Tarpley, Addiction, supra note 1 (explaining Tarpley played profes-
sional basketball in Greece on two occasions). For a further discussion of Tarp-
ley's basketball experience in Greece, see supra notes 35-36, 43 and accompanying
text.
198. See Danne, supra note 125, § 17 (emphasizing second step inquiry con-
centrates on job at issue).
199. See Posting of Chuck Carlton to Dallas Mavericks Blog, http://
mavsblog.dallasnews.com/archives/2007/08/whatever-happened-to-1.html (Aug.
2, 2007, 11:51 EST) [hereinafter Mavericks Blog] (noting Lucas helped rehabili-
tate Tarpley and supported his reinstatement).
200. See Tarpley Sues Team, supra note 12 ("Tarpley later entered a drug and
alcohol recovery program in 2003 with the help of former NBA coach John Lucas,
who has helped other athletes get clean."); Mavericks Blog, supra note 199 ("Tarp-
ley has spent the last year in Houston under the care of John Lucas, who runs an
drug-treatment aftercare program.").
201. See Tarpley, Addiction, supra note 1 (explaining NBA refused reinstate-
ment even though Lucas advocated Tarpley's reinstatement).
202. Mavericks Blog, supra note 199.
203. See Tarpley Sues Team, supra note 12 (describing Lucas as former NBA
coach); see also Mavericks Blog, supra note 199 (noting Lucas ran alcohol and drug
recovery program).
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knee problems.20 5 In the 2004-2005 season, the average age among
NBA players was twenty-seven. 20 6 Only one player in the league was
older than Tarpley. 20 7 Accordingly, Tarpley may have a difficult
time proving that he was still physically capable of playing basket-
ball at the NBA level in 2003.208
2. Was Tarpley a Role Model?
An NBA player can have more than one essential function. 20 9
In addition to on the court performance, serving as a role model
may also be an essential function of an NBA player. In a case chal-
lenging random drug testing of high school athletes,21 0 the Su-
preme Court acknowledged that teenagers view professional
athletes as role models, particularly in regard to drug use.211 Fur-
ther, the league's collective bargaining agreement reflects the
NBA's belief that a professional basketball player should be a role
model.212 The collective bargaining agreement lists "the extent to
which the player has since comported himself as a suitable role
model for the youth" as a factor the NBA should consider when
determining whether to reinstate a player. 213 Accordingly, the
court could find that being a role model is an essential function of
an NBA player. 214
205. See id. (providing Tarpley was forty-one in 2006 and suffered two season-
ending knee injuries during NBA career and continued to suffer from injuries
during CBL career).
206. See NBA.com, 2004-05 Player Survey: Age, http://www.nba.com/news/
survey-age_2004.html (last visited May 1, 2008) (listing 27.02 years old as average
age of active NBA players during 2004-2005 season).
207. See id. (listing Kevin Willis of Atlantic Hawks as oldest active player at
forty-two and Reggie Miller of Indiana Pacers as second oldest current player at
thirty-nine during 2004-2005 season). Tarpley was thirty-nine in 2004. See Tarpley,
Addiction, supra note 1 (stating Tarpley was forty-one in 2006).
208. See Danne, supra note 125, § 4 (requiring individual to prove ability to
perform essential functions of job at issue).
209. See generally id. (stating "essential functions" as plural).
210. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 646 (1995) (explain-
ing challenge was based on random drug testing of high school athletes).
211. See id. at 663 ("It seems to us self-evident that a drug problem largely
fueled by the 'role model' effect of athletes' drug use, and of particular danger to
athletes, is effectively addressed by making sure that athletes do not use drugs.").
212. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) (3) (v) (2007) (listing "terms of collective bar-
gaining agreement" as factor used to determine job's essential functions).
213. Art. XXXIII, supra note 8, § 12.
214. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) (3) (v) (listing "terms of collective bargaining
agreement" as source of evidence for determining job's essential functions).
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If being a role model is an essential function of an NBA player,
Tarpley must prove that he was a role model in 2003.215 A role
model is "a person who serves as a model in a particular behavioral
or social role for another person to emulate. ' 216 Tarpley can claim
that he was a role model in 2003 because he was a successfully reha-
bilitated alcoholic and drug addict who could inspire others strug-
gling with substance abuse problems. 2 17
Conversely, the NBA can claim that Tarpley was not a role
model in 2003 because his claim that he was rehabilitated was not
credible. Tarpley previously claimed he was rehabilitated, only for
the NBA to dismiss him again for failing another drug test.218 If the
court finds that being a role model is an essential function of an
NBA player, Tarpley may have trouble proving that he was qualified
to be an NBA player in 2003.219
C. Did the NBA Take Adverse Action Against Tarpley Because
of His Disability?
Tarpley must demonstrate that the NBA took adverse action
against him because of his disability.220 Tarpley claims that the
NBA refused to reinstate him in 2003 because of his status as a re-
covering alcoholic and drug addict.2 2 1 The court will probably find
a causal connection between the NBA's refusal to reinstate Tarpley
and his status as a recovering alcoholic and drug addict, particularly
because the NBA previously disciplined Tarpley for his alcohol and
drug problems. 222
215. See Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1393 (5th Cir. 1993) (defining
"essential functions" as "functions that bear more than a marginal relationship to
the job at issue").
216. THE AM. HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENG. LANGUAGE (4th ed. Hough-
ton Mifflin Co. 2000), available at http://www.thefreedictionary.com/role+model.
217. See Tarpley, Addiction, supra note 1 (describing Tarpley's successful reha-
bilitation); see also Associated Press, supra note 2 (noting goal of Tarpley's lawsuit
was to help others with alcohol and drug problems).
218. See Tarpley, Addiction, supra note 1 (stating NBA granted Tarpley's rein-
statement after first dismissal, but dismissed him again for failing another drug
test).
219. See Danne, supra note 125, § 4 (requiring individual to be able to per-
form essential functions of job at issue).
220. See Moorer v. Baptist Mem'l Health Care Sys., 398 F.3d 469, 484-85 (6th
Cir. 2005) (emphasizing "'because of' his perceived disability" requirement (quot-
ing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a))). For a further discussion of the adverse action require-
ment, see supra notes 130-35 and accompanying text.
221. See Tarpley Sues Team, supra note 12 (providing basis of Tarpley's claim).
222. See Tarpley, Addiction, supra note I (explaining NBA previously suspended
and dismissed Tarpley for alcohol and drug related misconduct).
2008]
27
Muir: Drunk or Disabled - The Legal and Social Consequences of Roy Tarp
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2008
360 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
D. Does the NBA Have a Legitimate Non-Discriminatory Reason
For its Adverse Action?
If Tarpley satisfies the requirements of a prima facie ADA
claim, the burden shifts to the NBA to provide a legitimate non-
discriminatory reason for refusing to reinstate him. 223 When deter-
mining whether to reinstate a previously dismissed player, the col-
lective bargaining agreement suggests that the NBA consider
factors such as: the circumstances surrounding the player's dismis-
sal, the player's rehabilitation status, and the player's conduct after
dismissal. 224
Tarpley's rehabilitation status and conduct after dismissal sup-
port his claim for reinstatement because he repeatedly passed all
alcohol and drug tests, entered a rehabilitation program, and con-
tinued playing professional basketball. 225 The circumstances sur-
rounding Tarpley's dismissal, however, evidence his repeated
violations of the league's collective bargaining agreement, includ-
ing two previous suspensions and one previous dismissal. 226
The NBA can claim that Tarpley's repeated violations of the
league's collective bargaining agreement was the reason for refus-
ing to reinstate him. 22 7 Even though Tarpley's violations of the
league's collective bargaining agreement were related to his alco-
holism and drug addiction, the court can still find the violations to
be a legitimate non-discriminatory reason if it believes that the NBA
would also refuse to reinstate any other player who had the same
history of collective bargaining agreement violations.228 The ADA
223. See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 50 (2003) (citing McDon-
nell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)) (explaining that burden
shifts to employer if plaintiff proves prima facie ADA claim). For a further discus-
sion of how the burden shifts to the employer to provide a legitimate non-discrimi-
natory reason for its adverse action, see supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
224. See Art. XXXIII, supra note 8, § 12 (listing factors NBA should use when
determining whether to reinstate player).
225. See Tarpley, Addiction, supra note 1 (stating Tarpley passed all alcohol and
drug tests for previous four years and entered alcohol and drug rehabilitation
program).
226. See id. (explaining NBA dismissed Tarpley in 1995 for failing drug test
and previously suspended him twice and dismissed him once for alcohol and drug
related conduct).
227. See Hernandez, 540 U.S. at 50 (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802)
(explaining burden shifts to employer to prove legitimate non-discriminatory rea-
son for adverse action if plaintiff proves prima facie ADA claim).
228. See Koral, supra note 86, at 369-70 (distinguishing legitimate non-discrim-
inatory reasons). "[D]iscipline for behaviors attributable to alcoholism does not
violate the ADA. However, the EEOC has cautioned that [sic] any employer may
not discipline an alcoholic employee more severely than it does other employees
for the same misconduct." Id.
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does not require the NBA to lower its reinstatement standards for a
recovering alcoholic or drug addict.2 29 Repeated violations of the
collective bargaining agreement may be a legitimate non-discrimi-
natory reason for refusing to reinstate Tarpley so long as the NBA
did not treat Tarpley differently than it would any other player with
the same history of violations.23°
The NBA can also respond with other legitimate non-discrimi-
natory reasons for rejecting Tarpley's application for reinstatement.
For example, the NBA can claim that it believed that Tarpley was
no longer capable of playing at the NBA level because of his age
and proneness to injury.23 1 So long as the NBA would have refused
reinstatement to any other player with the same age and proneness
to injury, the reason is legitimate and non-discriminatory. 23 2
If the court finds that the NBA's reason for refusing to rein-
state Tarpley is legitimate and non-discriminatory, the burden of
proof shifts back to Tarpley. 233 Tarpley must then prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the NBA's reason for refusing reinstatement
is merely a pretext for discrimination. 234 Tarpley will probably not
be able to meet this burden. 235
229. See 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c) (4) (1990) (explaining employer can hold alco-
holic and drug abusing employees to same standards as other employees).
230. See Koral, supra note 86, at 369-70 (stating employers can discipline al-
coholics for misconduct, even if misconduct is alcohol related, so long as al-
coholics do not receive harsher discipline than non-alcoholics for same
misconduct).
231. See Tarpley, Addiction, supra note 1 (providing Tarpley was forty-one in
2006 and suffered two season-ending knee injuries during NBA career and contin-
ued to suffer from injury during CBL career). For a further discussion of why
Tarpley's age and proneness to injury may have rendered him incapable of per-
forming in the NBA in 2003, see supra notes 204-08 and accompanying text.
232. See 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c) (4) (stating employer can hold alcoholic em-
ployees to same standards as other employees).
233. See Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1185-86 (6th Cir.
1996) (explaining burden returns to plaintiff to prove employer's reason is pretext
for discrimination). For a further discussion of how the burden shifts back to the
plaintiff to prove that the employer's legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its
adverse action is a pretext for discrimination, see supra notes 139-43 and accompa-
nying text.
234. See id. at 1186 (requiring plaintiff to provide evidence that employer's
alleged legitimate non-discriminatory reason for adverse action is pretext for
discrimination).
235. My research has not disclosed any information indicating that Tarpley
can prove that the NBA's reason for refusing to reinstate him - either his repeated
violations of the collective bargaining agreement or his age and proneness to in-
jury - was a pretext for discrimination.
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IV. POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCE OF A VERDICT IN TARPLEY'S FAVOR
A verdict in Tarpley's favor may lead other professional ath-
letes who suffer from alcohol or drug problems to file discrimina-
tion claims. Tarpley's success in obtaining a right to sue letter from
the EEOC has already inspired two National Football League
("NFL") players to file similar claims. 23 6 Odell Thurman and Tor-
rie Cox independently filed discrimination claims with the EEOC,
alleging that the NFL violated the ADA.237
In 2005, the Cincinnati Bengals drafted Odell Thurman
("Thurman") out of the University of Georgia. 23 8 In his rookie sea-
son, Thurman, a middle linebacker, led his team in tackles.239
Thurman's NFL career appeared promising. 240 During the off-sea-
son, however, Thurman missed a mandatory drug test, and the NFL
suspended him for four games. 241 While suspended, the police ar-
rested Thurman for driving under the influence.242 In response,
the NFL increased his suspension from four games to one year. 243
After Thurman served his one-year suspension, he applied for rein-
statement, but the NFL denied his application without citing a rea-
son.244 Thurman's agent claims that Thurman has since passed all
league mandated alcohol and drug tests. 245 In August of 2007,
Thurman filed a discrimination claim with the EEOC in attempt to
force the NFL to reinstate him. 246
236. See Posting of Michael McCann to Sports Law Blog, Odell Thurman and
Torrie Cox Filed EEOC Claims Against NFL, http://sports-law.blog spot.com/
2007_08_01_archive.html (Aug. 28, 2007, 17:10 EST) [hereinafter Odell Thurman]
(stating two NFL players used Tarpley's successful EEOC claim as support when
filing own EEOC claims).
237. See id. (describing Thurman and Cox's EEOC claims).
238. See id. (explaining how Bengals acquired Thurman).
239. See id. ("Thurman ... started as a rookie (middle linebacker) and led the
team in tackles (148 tackles, one sack, five interceptions, nine passes defensed and
four forced fumbles).").
240. See id. (explaining Thurman appeared to have "[b] right future ahead of
him").
241. See id. (stating NFL suspended Thurman after missing drug test).
242. See id. (stating police arrested Thurman during off-season for driving
under influence).
243. See id. (explaining NFL's response to Thurman's arrest).
244. See Len Pasquarelli, Bengals' Thurman, Bucs' Cox File Discrimination Claims
Against NFL, ESPN.coM, Aug. 17, 2007, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/
story?id=2978901 (noting NFL denied Thurman's application for reinstatement
without explanation).
245. See id. ("Thurman's agent, John Michels, said that, even though his client
acknowledged in court that he has a problem with alcohol, he has passed all the
league-administered tests.").246. See id. (stating Thurman filed EEOC claim hoping to have league sanc-
tions overturned).
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In 2003, the Tampa Bay Buccaneers ("Bucs") drafted Torrie
Cox ("Cox") out of the University of Pittsburgh. 247 Cox was a "key
reserve and a standout special teams performer" for the Bucs.248 In
2005, the NFL suspended Cox for one game after the police ar-
rested him for driving under the influence. 249 In 2007, the NFL
again suspended Cox for violating the league's substance abuse pol-
icy. 250 In August of 2007, Cox filed a discrimination claim with the
EEOC in attempt to get his suspension overturned. 251
Both Thurman and Cox filed claims shortly after the EEOC
issued Tarpley's right to sue letter, and both used Tarpley as sup-
port for their own respective claims. 25 2 Tarpley's EEOC success al-
ready inspired Thurman and Cox, 253 and the EEOC is only the first
hurdle in an ADA claim. 25 4 A verdict in Tarpley's favor would in-
spire even more professional athletes to file ADA claims, and these
athletes would, presumably, face less resistance because Tarpley's
case would provide favorable precedent.
V. CONCLUSION
Odell Thurman's and Torrie Cox's reliance on Tarpley ap-
pears premature. 255 The United States District Court for the South-
ern District of Texas will not find in Tarpley's favor.256 Tarpley's
burden of proof is too high.25 7
247. See Agent Tells Paper Cox Will Appeal Four-Game Suspension, ESPN.coM, July
6, 2007, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2928238 (explaining how
Cox entered NFL).
248. Id.
249. See id. (describing Cox's first NFL suspension).
250. See id. (explaining Cox's suspension that led to ADA claim).
251. See Pasquarelli, supra note 244 (stating Cox filed EEOC claim with hopes
to get suspension overturned).
252. See Odell Thurman, supra note 236 (noting similarities between Thur-
man's and Cox's claims and Tarpley's claim).
253. See id. (emphasizing Thurman's and Cox's reliance on Tarpley's claim).
254. See EEOC's Charge Processing Procedures, supra note 9 (explaining
right to sue letter is only prerequisite for pursuing discrimination lawsuit).
255. See Odell Thurman, supra note 236 (stating Thurman and Cox filed EEOC
claims after EEOC issued Tarpley's right to sue letter and both cited Tarpley's
successful claim in their respective claims). The court must issue a verdict in Tarp-
ley's favor in order for his claim to hold any precedent. See EEOC's Charge
Processing Procedures, supra note 9 (explaining right to sue letter is only first step
in discrimination lawsuit).
256. See Tarpley Sues Team, supra note 12 (noting where Tarpley filed lawsuit).
257. See Bailey v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 306 F.3d 1162, 1166 (lst Cir. 2002)
(listing requirements of prima facie ADA claim).
2008]
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Was Tarpley really disabled under the ADA?258 Tarpley will
not succeed in claiming that he has a record of a disability because
he does not have a record demonstrating that his alcoholism and
drug addiction substantially limited a major life activity. 259 Tarpley
will also not succeed in claiming that the NBA regarded him as sub-
stantially limited in his ability to work because NBA players do not
encompass a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs.260 Thus, the
court will probably not find that Tarpley was disabled within the
meaning of the ADA.
Was Tarpley qualified to be an NBA player in 2003?261 Tarp-
ley's previous experience in the NBA proves that he met the
league's prerequisites,2 62 and his experience in other professional
basketball leagues coupled with John Lucas's support establishes
that he could perform the essential functions of an NBA player.2 63
Consequently, the court will probably conclude that Tarpley was
qualified to be an NBA player.
Did the NBA refuse to reinstate Tarpley because of his history
of alcoholism and drug addiction?264 The NBA can claim that it
refused to reinstate Tarpley because he had repeatedly violated the
league's collective bargaining agreement. 265 The NBA can also
258. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (1990) (defining disability with respect to individ-
ual under ADA). For a further discussion of the definition of a disability under the
ADA, see supra notes 73-123 and accompanying text.
259. For a further discussion of Tarpley's record of a disability claim, see supra
notes 174-81 and accompanying text.
260. For a further discussion of Tarpley's regarded as disabled claim, see
supra notes 182-89 and accompanying text.
261. See Danne, supra note 125, § 4 (requiring individual to satisfyjob prereq-
uisites and be able to perform essential functions to be qualified). For a further
discussion of the definition of a qualified individual under the ADA, see supra
notes 124-29 and accompanying text.
262. For a further discussion of how Tarpley can prove he met the league's
prerequisites, see supra note 191 and accompanying text.
263. For a further discussion of how Tarpley can prove that he could perform
the essential functions of an NBA player, see supra notes 193-219 and accompany-
ing text.
264. See Moorer v. Baptist Mem'l Health Care Sys., 398 F.3d 469, 484-85 (6th
Cir. 2005) (requiring causal connection between employer's adverse action and
individual's disability); see also Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 50 (2003)
(citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)) (requiring
employer to provide legitimate non-discriminatory reason for adverse action if
plaintiff demonstrates prima facie ADA claim). For a further discussion of the
adverse action requirement and how the burden shifts to the employer to provide
a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its adverse action, see supra notes 130-38
and accompanying text.
265. For a further discussion of how the NBA can claim that it refused to
reinstate Tarpley because of his repeated violations of the collective bargaining
agreement, see supra notes 227-30 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 15: p. 333
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claim that it refused to reinstate him because his age and proneness
to injury rendered him incapable of competing at the NBA level. 266
The court will likely find that the NBA refused to reinstate Tarpley
for a legitimate non-discriminatory reason.
Is the NBA's legitimate non-discriminatory reason for refusing
to reinstate Tarpley merely a pretext for discrimination? 267 This
may be where Tarpley's greatest difficulty lies because he does not
appear to have any evidence indicating that his repeated collective
bargaining agreement violations or his age and proneness to injury
were anything but legitimate and non-discriminatory reasons for re-
fusing to reinstate him. 268
Tarpley's claim is not strong enough to overcome the NBA's
potential challenges. 269 Therefore, the court will probably find in
the NBA's favor. If, however, the court does find in Tarpley's favor,
it should prepare for the wave of litigation from substance abusing
professional athletes that will follow. 270
Robin L. Muir*
266. For a further discussion of how the NBA can claim that it refused to
reinstate Tarpley because of his age and proneness to injury, see supra notes 231-32
and accompanying text.
267. See Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1185-86 (6th Cir.
1996) (requiring plaintiff to prove employer's reason was pretext). For a further
discussion of how the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the em-
ployer's legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its adverse action is a pretext for
discrimination, see supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
268. For a further discussion of why Tarpley will not meet this burden, see
supra note 235.
269. For a further discussion of the legal analysis of Tarpley's claim, see supra
notes 169-235 and accompanying text.
270. For a further discussion of how a verdict in Tarpley's favor will inspire
other substance abusing professional athletes to file ADA claims, see supra notes
236-54 and accompanying text.
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